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PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES,
AND INALIENABILITY:
ONE VIEW OF THE CATHEDRAL
Guido Calabresi * and A. Douglas Melamed
Professor Calabresi and Mr. Melamed develop a framework for
legal analysis which they believe serves to integrate various legal
relationships which are traditionally analyzed in separate subject
areas such as Property and Torts. By using their model to suggest
solutions to the pollution problem that have been overlooked by
writers in the field, and by applying the model to the question of
criminal sanctions, they demonstrate the utility of such an integrated
approach.
I. INTRODUCTIONO NLY rarely are Property and Torts approached from a uni-
fied perspective. Recent writings by lawyers concerned with
economics and by economists concerned with law suggest, how-
ever, that an attempt at integrating the various legal relationships
treated by these subjects would be useful both for the beginning
student and the sophisticated scholar.' By articulating a concept
of "entitlements" which are protected by property, liability, or
inalienability rules, we present one framework for such an ap-
proach.2 We then analyze aspects of the pollution problem and of
* John Thomas Smith Professor of Law, Yale University. B.S. Yale, i953; B.A.
Oxford, T955; LL.B. Yale, 1958; M.A. Oxford, 1959.
** Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. Yale University, 1967; J.D.
Harvard University, 1970.
See, e.g., Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on
Calabresi's Costs, So YAL_ L.J. 647 (1971) (analysis of three alternative rules in
pollution problems); Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am.
EcoN. REv. 347 (1967) (Vol. 2 -Papers and Proceedings) (analysis of property
as a means of cost internalization which ignores liability rule alternatives).
2 Since a fully integrated approach is probably impossible, it should be empha-
sized that this article concerns only one possible way of looking at and analyzing
legal problems. Thus we shall not address ourselves to those fundamental legal
questions which center on what institutions and what procedures are most suitable
for making what decisions, except insofar as these relate directly to the problems
of selecting the initial entitlements and the modes of protecting these entitlements.
While we do not underrate the importance, indeed perhaps the primacy, of legal
process considerations, see pp. 1116-17 infra, we are merely interested in the light
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criminal sanctions in order to demonstrate how the model enables
us to perceive relationships which have been ignored by writers
in those fields.
The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is one
we call the problem of "entitlement." Whenever a state is pre-
sented with the conflicting interests of two or more people, or two
or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor.
Absent such a decision, access to goods, services, and life itself will
be decided on the basis of "might makes right" -whoever is
stronger or shrewder will win.' Hence the fundamental thing that
law does is to decide which of the conflicting parties will be en-
titled to prevail. The entitlement to make noise versus the en-
titlement to have silence, the entitlement to pollute versus the
entitlement to breathe clean air, the entitlement to have children
versus the entitlement to forbid them - these are the first order
of legal decisions.
Having made its initial choice, society must enforce that
choice. Simply setting the entitlement does not avoid the problem
of "might makes right"; a minimum of state intervention is always
necessary.' Our conventional notions make this easy to compre-
that a rather different approach may shed on problems frequently looked at pri-
marily from a legal process point of view.
As Professor Harry Wellington is fond of saying about many discussions of
law, this article is meant to be only one of Monet's paintings of the Cathedral at
Rouen. To understand the Cathedral one must see all of them. See G. HAMILTON,
CLAUDE MONET'S PAINTINGS or ROUEN CATHEDRAL 4-5, 19-20, 27 (196o).
' One could of course look at the state as simply a larger coalition of friends
designed to enforce rules which merely accomplish the dominant coalition's desires.
Rules of law would then be no more than "might makes right" writ large. Such
a view does not strike us as plausible if for no other reason than that the state
decides too many issues in response to too many different coalitions. This fact, by
itself, would require a different form of analysis from that which would suffice to
explain entitlements resulting from more direct and decentralized uses of "might
makes right."
4 For an excellent presentation of this general point by an economist, see
Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J. LAW & EcoN.
435 (1971).
We do not intend to imply that the state relies on force to enforce all or most
entitlements. Nor do we imply that absent state intervention only force would
win. The use by the state of feelings of obligation and rules of morality as means
of enforcing most entitlements is not only crucial but terribly efficient. Conversely,
absent the state, individuals would probably agree on rules of behavior which
would govern entitlements in whole series of situations on the basis of criteria
other than "might makes right." That these rules might themselves reflect the same
types of considerations we will analyze as bases for legal entitlements is, of course,
neither here nor there. What is important is that these "social compacts" would,
no less than legal entitlements, give rise to what may be called obligations. These
obligations in turn would cause people to behave in accordance with the compact in
particular cases regardless of the existence of a predominant force. In this article
[Vol. 85:1o891o9o
HeinOnline -- 85 Harv. L. Rev.  1090 1971-1972
PROTECTING ENTITLEMENTS
hend with respect to private property. If Taney owns a cabbage
patch and Marshall, who is bigger, wants a cabbage, he will get it
unless the state intervenes. But it is not so obvious that the state
must also intervene if it chooses the opposite entitlement, com-
munal property. If large Marshall has grown some communal
cabbages and chooses to deny them to small Taney, it will take
state action to enforce Taney's entitlement to the communal cab-
bages. The same symmetry applies with respect to bodily in-
tegrity. Consider the plight of the unwilling ninety-eight-pound
weakling in a state which nominally entitles him to bodily in-
tegrity but will not intervene to enforce the entitlement against a
lustful Juno. Consider then the plight - absent state intervention
- of the ninety-eight-pounder who desires an unwilling Juno in
a state which nominally entitles everyone to use everyone else's
body. The need for intervention applies in a slightly more com-
plicated way to injuries. When a loss is left where it falls in an
auto accident, it is not because God so ordained it. Rather it is
because the state has granted the injurer an entitlement to be free
of liability and will intervene to prevent the victim's friends, if
they are stronger, from taking compensation from the injurer.6
The loss is shifted in other cases because the state has granted
an entitlement to compensation and will intervene to prevent the
stronger injurer from rebuffing the victim's requests for com-
pensation.
we are not concerned as much with the workings of such obligations as with the
reasons which may explain the rules which themselves give rise to the obligations.
"Bigger" obviously does not refer simply to size, but to the sum of an indi-
vidual's resources. If Marshall's gang possesses superior brain and brawn to that
of Taney, Marshall's gang will get the cabbages.
' Different cultures deal with the problem in different ways. Witness the fol-
lowing account:
"Life Insurance" Fee is 4 Bulls and $i2oo. Port Moresby, New Guinea. Peter
Howard proved that he values his life more than four bulls and $12oo. But he
wants $24 and one pig in change.
Mr. Howard gave the money and livestock to members of the Jiga tribe,
which had threatened to kill him because he killed a tribe member in an auto
accident last October 29.
The police approved the extortion agreement after telling the 38 year old
Mr. Howard they could not protect him from the sworn vengeance of the
tribe, which lives at Mt. Hagen, about 350 miles Northeast of Port Moresby.
Mr. Howard, of Cambridge, England, was attacked and badly beaten by
the tribesmen after the accident.
They said he would be killed unless the payment of money and bulls was
made according to the tribal traditions. It was the first time a white man in
New Guinea had been forced to bow to tribal laws.
After making the payment, Mr. Howard demanded to be compensated for
the assault on him by the tribesmen. He said he wanted $24 and one pig. A
Jiga spokesman told him the tribe would "think about it." New York Times,
Feb. 16, 1972, at r7, col. 6.
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The state not only has to decide whom to entitle, but it must
also simultaneously make a series of equally difficult second order
decisions. These decisions go to the manner in which entitlements
are protected and to whether an individual is allowed to sell or
trade the entitlement. In any given dispute, for example, the state
must decide not only which side wins but also the kind of protec-
tion to grant. It is with the latter decisions, decisions which shape
the subsequent relationship between the winner and the loser, that
this article is primarily concerned. We shall consider three types
of entitlements - entitlements protected by property rules, en-
titlements protected by liability rules, and inalienable entitle-
ments. The categories are not, of course, absolutely distinct; but
the categorization is useful since it reveals some of the reasons
which lead us to protect certain entitlements in certain ways.
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent
that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its
holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which
the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller. It is the
form of entitlement which gives rise to the least amount of state
intervention: once the original entitlement is decided upon, the
state does not try to decide its value.' It lets each of the parties
say how much the entitlement is worth to him, and gives the seller
a veto if the buyer does not offer enough. Property rules involve
a collective decision as to who is to be given an initial entitle-
ment but not as to the value of the entitlement.
Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitle-
ment is protected by a liability rule. This value may be what it is
thought the original holder of the entitlement would have sold it
for. But the holder's complaint that he would have demanded
more will not avail him once the objectively determined value is
set. Obviously, liability rules involve an additional stage of state
intervention: not only are entitlements protected, but their trans-
fer or destruction is allowed on the basis of a value determined by
some organ of the state rather than by the parties themselves.
An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is
not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller. The
state intervenes not only to determine who is initially entitled
and to determine the compensation that must be paid if the en-
' A property rule requires less state intervention only in the sense that inter-
vention is needed to decide upon and enforce the initial entitlement but not for
the separate problem of determining the value of the entitlement. Thus, if a par-
ticular property entitlement is especially difficult to enforce - for example, the right
to personal security in urban areas - the actual amount of state intervention can
be very high and could, perhaps, exceed that needed for some entitlements pro-
tected by easily administered liability rules.
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titlement is taken or destroyed, but also to forbid its sale under
some or all circumstances. Inalienability rules are thus quite
different from property and liability rules. Unlike those rules,
rules of inalienability not only "protect" the entitlement; they
may also be viewed as limiting or regulating the grant of the en-
titlement itself.
It should be clear that most entitlements to most goods are
mixed. Taney's house may be protected by a property rule in
situations where Marshall wishes to purchase it, by a liability rule
where the government decides to take it by eminent domain, and
by a rule of inalienability in situations where Taney is drunk or
incompetent. This article will explore two primary questions: (i)
In what circumstances should we grant a particular entitlement?
and (2) In what circumstances should we decide to protect that
entitlement by using a property, liability, or inalienability rule?
II. THE SETTING OF ENTITLEMENTS
What are the reasons for deciding to entitle people to pollute
or to entitle people to forbid pollution, to have children freely or
to limit procreation, to own property or to share property? They
can be grouped under three headings: economic efficiency, distri-
butional preferences, and other justice considerations.'
A. Economic Efficiency
Perhaps the simplest reason for a particular entitlement is to
minimize the administrative costs of enforcement. This was the
reason Holmes gave for letting the costs lie where they fall in
accidents unless some clear societal benefit is achieved by shifting
them.' By itself this reason will never justify any result except
that of letting the stronger win, for obviously that result mini-
mizes enforcement costs. Nevertheless, administrative efficiency
may be relevant to choosing entitlements when other reasons are
taken into account. This may occur when the reasons accepted
are indifferent between conflicting entitlements and one entitle-
ment is cheaper to enforce than the others. It may also occur
when the reasons are not indifferent but lead us only slightly to
prefer one over another and the first is considerably more expen-
sive to enforce than the second.
But administrative efficiency is just one aspect of the broader
concept of economic efficiency. Economic efficiency asks that we
8 See generally G. CALABRESI, Tnm Costs or AcclmDEs 24-33 (1970) [herein-
after cited as CosTS].
9 See O.W. HoLmEs, JR., THE COMMON LAw 76-77 (Howe ed. x963). For a
criticism of the justification as applied to accidents today, see CosTs 261-63. But
cf. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, i J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
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choose the set of entitlements which would lead to that allocation
of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a
further change would not so improve the condition of those who
gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and
still be better off than before. This is often called Pareto opti-
mality.10 To give two examples, economic efficiency asks for that
combination of entitlements to engage in risky activities and to be
free from harm from risky activities which will most likely lead
to the lowest sum of accident costs and of costs of avoiding
accidents." It asks for that form of property, private or com-
munal, which leads to the highest product for the effort of produc-
ing.
Recently it has been argued that on certain assumptions,
usually termed the absence of transaction costs, Pareto optimality
or economic efficiency will occur regardless of the initial entitle-
ment.' 2 For this to hold, "no transaction costs" must be under-
o We are not here concerned with the many definitional variations which en-
circle the concept of Pareto optimality. Many of these variations stem from the
fact that unless compensation actually occurs after a change (and this itself assumes
a preexisting set of entitlements from which one makes a change to a Pareto op-
timal arrangement), the redistribution of wealth implicit in the change may well
make a return to the prior position also seem Pareto optimal. There are any num-
ber of variations on this theme which economists have studied at length. Since in
the world in which lawyers must live, anything close to Pareto efficiency, even if
desirable, is not attainable, these refinements need not detain us even though they
are crucial to a full understanding of the concept.
Most versions of Pareto optimality are based on the premise that individuals
know best what is best for them. Hence they assume that to determine whether
those who gain from a change could compensate those who lose, one must look
to the values the individuals themselves give to the gains and losses. Economic
efficiency may, however, present a broader notion which does not depend upon
this individualistic premise. It may be that the state, for paternalistic reasons, see
pp. 1113-14 infra, is better able to determine whether the total gain of the winners
is greater than the total loss of the losers.
" The word "costs" is here used in a broad way to include all the disutilities
resulting from an accident and its avoidance. As such it is not limited to mone-
tary costs, or even to those which could in some sense be "monetizable," but rather
includes disutilities or "costs" -for instance, the loss to an individual of his leg
-the very expression of which in monetary terms would seem callous. One of the
consequences of not being able to put monetary values on some disutilities or
"costs" is that the market is of little use in gauging their worth, and this in turn
gives rise to one of the reasons why liability, or inalienability rules, rather than
property rules may be used.
" This proposition was first established in Coase's classic article, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. I (ig6o), and has been refined in subsequent
literature. See, e.g., Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Lia-
bility Rules-A Comment, Ii J. LAW & EcoN. 67 (1968); Nutter, The Coase
Theorem on Social Cost: A Footnote, ii J. LAW & EcoN. 503 (1968). See also
G. STIoLER, THE THEORY Or PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966); Mishan, Pareto Optimality
and the Law, i9 OxFoRD EcoN. PAPERS 255 (1967).
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stood extremely broadly as involving both perfect knowledge and
the absence of any impediments or costs of negotiating. Negoti-
ation costs include, for example, the cost of excluding would-be
freeloaders from the fruits of market bargains. 3 In such a fric-
tionless society, transactions would occur until no one could be
made better off as a result of further transactions without making
someone else worse off. This, we would suggest, is a necessary,
indeed a tautological, result of the definitions of Pareto optimality
and of transaction costs which we have given.
Such a result would not mean, however, that the same alloca-
tion of resources would exist regardless of the initial set of en-
titlements. Taney's willingness to pay for the right to make noise
may depend on how rich he is; Marshall's willingness to pay for
silence may depend on his wealth. In a society which entitles
Taney to make noise and which forces Marshall to buy silence
from Taney, Taney is wealthier and Marshall poorer than each
would be in a society which had the converse set of entitlements.
Depending on how Marshall's desire for silence and Taney's for
noise vary with their wealth, an entitlement to noise will result in
negotiations which will lead to a different quantum of noise than
would an entitlement to silence. 4 This variation in the quantity
"a The freeloader is the person who refuses to be inoculated against smallpox
because, given the fact that almost everyone else is inoculated, the risk of smallpox
to him is less than the risk of harm from the inoculation. He is the person who
refuses to pay for a common park, though he wants it, because he believes that
others will put in enough money to make the park available to him. See COSTS
137 n.4. The costs of excluding the freeloader from the benefits for which he re-
fused to pay may well be considerable as the two above examples should suggest.
This is especially so since these costs may include the inefficiency of pricing a good,
like the park once it exists, above its marginal cost in order to force the freeloader
to disclose his true desire to use it -thus enabling us to charge him part of the
cost of establishing it initially.
It is the capacity of the market to induce disclosure of individual preferences
which makes it theoretically possible for the market to bring about exchanges lead-
ing to Pareto optimality. But the freeloader situation is just one of many where
no such disclosure is achieved by the market. If we assume perfect knowledge,
defined more broadly than is normally done to include knowledge of individual
preferences, then such situations pose no problem. This definition of perfect knowl-
edge, though perhaps implicit in the concept of no transaction costs, would not
only make reaching Pareto optimality easy through the market, it would make it
equally easy to establish a similar result by collective fiat.
For a further discussion of what is implied by a broad definition of no trans-
action costs, see note 59 infra. For a discussion of other devices which may induce
individuals to disclose their preferences, see note 38 infra.
4 See Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD EcoN. PAPERS 255
(1967). Unless Taney's and Marshall's desires for noise and silence are totally
unaffected by their wealth, that is, their desires are totally income inelastic, a
change in their wealth will alter the value each places on noise and silence and
hence will alter the outcome of their negotiations.
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of noise and silence can be viewed as no more than an instance
of the well accepted proposition that what is a Pareto optimal, or
economically efficient, solution varies with the starting distribu-
tion of wealth. Pareto optimality is optimal given a distribution
of wealth, but different distributions of wealth imply their own
Pareto optimal allocation of resources."5
All this suggests why distributions of wealth may affect a
society's choice of entitlements. It does not suggest why economic
efficiency should affect the choice, if we assume an absence of
any transaction costs. But no one makes an assumption of no
transaction costs in practice. Like the physicist's assumption of
no friction or Say's law in macro-economics, the assumption of
no transaction costs may be a useful starting point, a device which
helps us see how, as different elements which may be termed
transaction costs become important, the goal of economic effi-
ciency starts to prefer one allocation of entitlements over
another.'"
Since one of us has written at length on how in the presence
of various types of transaction costs a society would go about
deciding on a set of entitlements in the field of accident law,'" it
is enough to say here: (i) that economic efficiency standing alone
would dictate that set of entitlements which favors knowledge-
able choices between social benefits and the social costs of obtain-
ing them, and between social costs and the social costs of avoiding
them; (2) that this implies, in the absence of certainty as to
whether a benefit is worth its costs to society, that the cost should
be put on the party or activity best located to make such a cost-
benefit analysis; (3) that in particular contexts like accidents or
pollution this suggests putting costs on the party or activity which
15 There should be no implication that a Pareto optimal solution is in some
sense better than a non-Pareto optimal solution which results in a different wealth
distribution. The implication is only that given the same wealth distribution
Pareto optimal is in some meaningful sense preferable to non-Pareto optimal.
16 See Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, i J. LEGAL STUD.
13, 25-28 (1972); Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to
the Scholars, i J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-12 (1972).
The trouble with a term like "no transaction costs" is that it covers a multi-
tude of market failures. The appropriate collective response, if the aim is to ap-
proach Pareto optimality, will vary depending on what the actual impediments to
full bargaining are in any given cases. Occasionally the appropriate response may
be to ignore the impediments. If the impediments are merely the administrative
costs of establishing a market, it may be that doing nothing is preferable to at-
tempting to correct for these costs because the administrative costs of collective
action may be even greater. Similarly, if the impediments are due to a failure of
the market to cause an accurate disclosure of freeloaders' preferences it may be
that the collective can do no better.
" See CosTs 135-97.
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can most cheaply avoid them; (4) that in the absence of certainty
as to who that party or activity is, the costs should be put on the
party or activity which can with the lowest transaction costs act
in the market to correct an error in entitlements by inducing the
party who can avoid social costs most cheaply to do so; " and
(5) that since we are in an area where by hypothesis markets do
not work perfectly - there are transaction costs - a decision will
often have to be made on whether market transactions or collec-
tive fiat is most likely to bring us closer to the Pareto optimal re-
sult the "perfect" market would reach. 9
Complex though this summary may suggest the entitlement
choice to be, in practice the criteria it represents will frequently
indicate which allocations of entitlements are most likely to lead
to optimal market judgments between having an extra car or
taking a train, getting an extra cabbage and spending less time
working in the hot sun, and having more widgets and breathing
the pollution that widget production implies. Economic efficiency
is not, however, the sole reason which induces a society to select a
"I In The Costs of Accidents, the criteria here summarized are discussed at
length and broken down into subcriteria which deal with the avoidance of dif-
ferent types of externalization and with the finding of the "best briber." Such
detailed analysis is necessary to the application of the criteria to any specific area
of law. At the level of generality of this article it did not seem to us necessary.
11 In accident law this election takes the form of a choice between general or
market deterrence and specific deterrence, in which the permitted level and manner
of accident causing activities is determined collectively. For example, society may
decide to grant an entitlement to drive and an entitlement to be compensated for
accidents resulting from driving, and allow decisions by individual parties to deter-
mine the level and manner of driving. But a greater degree of specific deterrence
could be achieved by selecting a different set of initial entitlements in order to
accord with a collective cost-benefit analysis -by, for example, prohibiting cars
of more than a certain horsepower.
The primary disadvantage of specific deterrence, as compared with general de-
terrence, is that it requires the central decisionmaker not only to determine the
costs of any given activity, but also to measure its benefits, in order to determine
the optimum level of activity. It is exceedingly difficult and exceedingly costly for
any centralized decisionmaker to be fully informed of the costs and benefits of a
wide range of activities. The irony is that collective fiat functions best in a world
of costless perfect information; yet in a world of costless transactions, including
costless information, the optimum allocation would be reached by market trans-
actions, and the need to consider the alternative of collective fiat would not arise.
One could, however, view the irony conversely, and say that the market works
best under assumptions of perfect knowledge where collective fiat would work
perfectly, rendering the market unnecessary. The fact that both market and col-
lective determinations face difficulties in achieving the Pareto optimal result which
perfect knowledge and no transaction costs would permit does not mean that the
same difficulties are always as great for the two approaches. Thus, there are many
situations in which we can assume fairly confidently that the market will do better
than a collective decider, and there are situations where we can assume the oppo-
site to be true. See CosTs 103-13.
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set of entitlements. Wealth distribution preferences are another,
and thus it is to distributional grounds for different entitlements
to which we must now turn.
B. Distributional Goals
There are, we would suggest, at least two types of distribu-
tional concerns which may affect the choice of entitlements.
These involve distribution of wealth itself and distribution of
certain specific goods, which have sometimes been called merit
goods.
All societies have wealth distribution preferences. They are,
nonetheless, harder to talk about than are efficiency goals. For
efficiency goals can be discussed in terms of a general concept like
Pareto optimality to which exceptions - like paternalism - can
be noted." Distributional preferences, on the other hand, can-
not usefully be discussed in a single conceptual framework. There
are some fairly broadly accepted preferences - caste preferences
in one society, more rather than less equality in another society.
There are also preferences which are linked to dynamic efficiency
concepts- producers ought to be rewarded since they will cause
everyone to be better off in the end. Finally, there are a myriad
of highly individualized preferences as to who should be richer and
who poorer which need not have anything to do with either
equality or efficiency - silence lovers should be richer than noise
lovers because they are worthier."
Difficult as wealth distribution preferences are to analyze, it
should be obvious that they play a crucial role in the setting of
entitlements. For the placement of entitlements has a funda-
mental effect on a society's distribution of wealth. It is not
enough, if a society wishes absolute equality, to start everyone
off with the same amount of money. A financially egalitarian
society which gives individuals the right to make noise imme-
diately makes the would-be noisemaker richer than the silence
20 For a discussion of paternalism, see pp. 113-14 infra.
21 The first group of preferences roughly coincides with those notions which
writers like Fletcher, following Aristotle, term distributive justice. The second and
third groups, instead, presumably deal with Fletcher's "corrective" justice - re-
wards based on what people do rather than what they are. See Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 n.40 (1972).
Within the "corrective" justice category our second and third groupings dis-
tinguish those preferences which are transparently linked to efficiency notions from
those whose roots are less obvious. If there were a generally accepted theory of
desserts, one could speak in general terms about the role the third group plays
just as one tends to speak about the role of either the first or second group. We
do not believe that an adequate theory of desserts - even if possible - is cur-
rently available. See also pp. 1102-o 5 infra.
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loving hermit.22 Similarly, a society which entitles the person with
brains to keep what his shrewdness gains him implies a different
distribution of wealth from a society which demands from each
according to his relative ability but gives to each according to his
relative desire. One can go further and consider that a beautiful
woman or handsome man is better off in a society which entitles
individuals to bodily integrity than in one which gives everybody
use of all the beauty available.
The consequence of this is that it is very difficult to imagine
a society in which there is complete equality of wealth. Such a
society either would have to consist of people who were all pre-
cisely the same, or it would have to compensate for differences in
wealth caused by a given set of entitlements. The former is, of
course, ridiculous, even granting cloning. And the latter would
be very difficult; it would involve knowing what everyone's tastes
were and taxing every holder of an entitlement at a rate sufficient
to make up for the benefits the entitlement gave him. For example,
it would involve taxing everyone with an entitlement to private use
of his beauty or brains sufficiently to compensate those less favor-
ably endowed but who nonetheless desired what beauty or brains
could get.
If perfect equality is impossible, a society must choose what
entitlements it wishes to have on the basis of criteria other than
perfect equality. In doing this, a society often has a choice of
methods, and the method chosen will have important distribu-
tional implications. Society can, for instance, give an entitle-
ment away free and then, by paying the holders of the entitle-
ment to limit their use of it, protect those who are injured by
the free entitlement. Conversely, it can allow people to do a
given thing only if they buy the right from the government.
Thus a society can decide whether to entitle people to have chil-
dren and then induce them to exercise control in procreating, or
to require people to buy the right to have children in the first
place. A society can also decide whether to entitle people to be
free of military service and then induce them to join up, or to
require all to serve but enable each to buy his way out. Which
entitlement a society decides to sell, and which it decides to give
away, will likely depend in part on which determination promotes
the wealth distribution that society favors. 3
22 This assumes that there is not enough space for the noisemaker and the
silence lover to coexist without intruding upon one another. In other words, this
assumes that we are dealing with a problem of allocation of scarce resources; if
we were not, there would be no need to set the initial entitlement. See generally
Mishan, supra note 12.
23 Any entitlement given away free implies a converse which must be paid for.
For all those who like children, there are those who are disturbed by children;
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If the choice of entitlements affects wealth distribution gen-
erally, it also affects the chances that people will obtain what
have sometimes been called merit goods." Whenever a society
wishes to maximize the chances that individuals will have at least
a minimum endowment of certain particular goods - education,
clothes, bodily integrity - the society is likely to begin by giving
the individuals an entitlement to them. If the society deems such
an endowment to be essential regardless of individual desires, it
will, of course, make the entitlement inalienable.25 Why, how-
ever, would a society entitle individuals to specific goods rather
than to money with which they can buy what they wish, unless
it deems that it can decide better than the individuals what benefits
them and society; unless, in other words, it wishes to make the
entitlement inalienable?
We have seen that an entitlement to a good or to its converse
is essentially inevitable. 26 We either are entitled to have silence
or entitled to make noise in a given set of circumstances. We
either have the right to our own property or body or the right
to share others' property or bodies. We may buy or sell our-
for all those who detest armies, there are those who want what armies accomplish.
Otherwise, we would have no scarce resource problem and hence no entitlement
problem. Therefore, one cannot simply say that giving away an entitlement free
is progressive while selling it is regressive. It is true that the more "free" goods
there are the less inequality of wealth there is, if everything else has stayed the
same. But if a free entitlement implies a costly converse, entitlements are not in
this sense free goods. And the issue of their progressivity and regressivity must
depend on the relative desire for the entitlement as against its converse on the
part of the rich and the poor.
Strictly speaking, even this is true only if the money needed to finance the alter-
native plans, or made available to the government as a result of the plans, is
raised and spent in a way that is precisely neutral with respect to wealth distri-
bution. The point is simply this: even a highly regressive tax will aid wealth
equality if the money it raises is all spent to benefit the poorest citizens. And even
a system of outdoor relief for the idle rich aids wealth equality if the funds it
requires are raised by taxing only the wealthiest of the wealthy. Thus whenever
one speaks of a taxing program, spending program, or a system of entitlements as
progressive or regressive, one must be assuming that the way the money is spent
(if it is a tax) or the way it is raised (if it is a spending program) does not
counter the distributive effect of the program itself.
24 Cf. R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE x3-I4 (1959).
" The commonly given reasons why a society may choose to do this are dis-
cussed infra at pp. ixzI-i5. All of them are, of course, reasons which explain why
such goods are often categorized as merit goods. When a society subsidizes a
good it makes a similar decision based on similar grounds. Presumably, however,
in such cases the grounds only justify making possession of the good less costly
than would he the case without government intervention, rather than making
possession of the good inevitable.
26 This is true unless we are prepared to let the parties settle the matter on the
basis of might makes right, which itself may also be viewed as a form of entitle-
ment.
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selves into the opposite position, but we must start somewhere.
Under these circumstances, a society which prefers people to
have silence, or own property, or have bodily integrity, but which
does not hold the grounds for its preference to be sufficiently
strong to justify overriding contrary preferences by individuals,
will give such entitlements according to the collective preference,
even though it will allow them to be sold thereafter.
Whenever transactions to sell or buy entitlements are very
expensive, such an initial entitlement decision will be nearly as
effective in assuring that individuals will have the merit good as
would be making the entitlement inalienable. Since coercion is
inherent because of the fact that a good cannot practically be
bought or sold, a society can choose only whether to make an
individual have the good, by giving it to him, or to prevent him
from getting it by giving him money instead.2 1 In such circum-
stances society will pick the entitlement it deems favorable to the
general welfare and not worry about coercion or alienability;
it has increased the chances that individuals will have a particular
good without increasing the degree of coercion imposed on indi-
viduals..2 ' A common example of this may occur where the good
involved is the present certainty of being able to buy a future
benefit and where a futures market in that good is too expensive
to be feasible.29
"' For a discussion of this inevitable, and therefore irrelevant degree of co-
ercion in the accident context, see CosTs 5o-55, 161-73.
28The situation is analogous to that which involves choosing between systems
of allocation of accident costs which minimize rapid changes in wealth, through
spreading, and those that do not. Indeed, if the avoidance of rapid changes in
wealth is, itself, viewed as a merit good, the analogy is complete. In the accident
field a great deal of attention has been devoted to the problem of rapid changes
in wealth. See, e.g., Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Acci-
dents, 11o U. PA. L. RaV. 913, 924 (1962). But see W. BLUM & H. KALvEN, PUB-
LIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM - AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS
(1965).
2 A full discussion of this justification for the giving of goods in "kind" is
well beyond the scope of this article. An indication of what is involved may be
in order, however. One of the many reasons why the right to vote is given in kind
instead of giving individuals that amount of money which would assure them, in a
voteless society, of all the benefits which having the vote gives them, is that at
any given time the price of those benefits in the future is totally uncertain and,
therefore, virtually no amount of money would assure individuals of having those
future benefits. This would not be the case if an entrepreneur could be counted
on to guarantee those future benefits in exchange for a present money payment.
That is what happens in a futures market for, say, sow's bellies. The degree of
uncertainty in the cost of the future benefits of the vote is such, however, that a
futures market is either not feasible, or, what is the same thing, much too costly
to be worthwhile. In such circumstances the nonmarket alternative of giving of
the good in kind seems more efficient. Many of the merit goods which are, in
fact, given in kind in our society - for example, education - share this character-
1972] II01
HeinOnline -- 85 Harv. L. Rev.  1101 1971-1972
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
C. Other Justice Reasons
The final reasons for a society's choice of initial entitlements
we termed other justice reasons, and we may as well admit that
it is hard to know what content can be poured into that term,
at least given the very broad definitions of economic efficiency
and distributional goals that we have used. Is there, in other
words, a reason which would influence a society's choice of initial
entitlements that cannot be comprehended in terms of efficiency
and distribution? A couple of examples will indicate the problem.
Taney likes noise; Marshall likes silence. They are, let us
assume, inevitably neighbors. Let us also assume there are no
transaction costs which may impede negotiations between them.
Let us assume finally that we do not know Taney's and Marshall's
wealth or, indeed, anything else about them. Under these circum-
stances we know that Pareto optimality - economic efficiency -
will be reached whether we choose an entitlement to make noise
or to have silence. We also are indifferent, from a general wealth
distribution point of view, as to what the initial entitlement is
because we do not know whether it will lead to greater equality
or inequality. This leaves us with only two reasons on which to
base our choice of entitlement. The first is the relative worthiness
of silence lovers and noise lovers. The second is the consistency
of the choice, or its apparent consistency, with other entitlements
in the society.
The first sounds appealing, and it sounds like justice. But it
is hard to deal with. Why, unless our choice affects other people,
should we prefer one to another? 30 To say that we wish, for
istic of involving present rights to future benefits in circumstances where a futures
market does not exist and at first glance seems very difficult to organize cheaply.
We do not suggest that this is the sole explanation for the way voting is handled
in our society. For instance, it does not explain why the vote cannot be sold. (An
explanation for that may be found in the fact that Taney's benefit from the vote
may depend on Marshall's not having more of it than he.) It does, however, add
another, not frequently given, explanation for the occasional allocation of goods
rather than money to individuals.
'oThe usual answer is religious or transcendental reasons. But this answer
presents problems. If it means that Chase, a third party, suffers if the noise-
maker is preferred, because Chase's faith deems silence worthier than noise, then
third parties are affected by the choice. Chase suffers; there is an external effect.
But that possibility was excluded in our hypothetical. In practice such external
effects, often called moralisms, are extremely common and greatly complicate the
reaching of Pareto optimality. See pp. 1112-13 infra.
Religious or transcendental reasons may, however, be of another kind. Chase
may prefer silence not because he himself cares, not because he suffers if noise-
makers get the best of it when his faith deems silence lovers to be worthier, but
because he believes God suffers if such a choice is made. No amount of com-
pensation will help Chase in this situation since he suffers nothing which can be
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instance, to make the silence lover relatively wealthier because
we prefer silence is no answer, for that is simply a restatement
of the question. Of course, if the choice does affect people other
than Marshall and Taney, then we have a valid basis for decision.
But the fact that such external effects are extremely common and
greatly influence our choices does not help us much. It does
suggest that the reaching of Pareto optimality is, in practice, a
very complex matter precisely because of the existence of many
external effects which markets find hard to deal with. And it also
suggests that there often are general distributional considerations
between Taney-Marshall and the rest of the world which affect
the choice of entitlement. It in no way suggests, however, that
there is more to the choice between Taney-Marshall than Pareto
optimality and distributional concerns. In other words, if the
assumptions of no transaction costs and indifference as to dis-
tributional considerations, made as between Taney and Marshall
(where they are unlikely), could be made as to the world as a
whole (where they are impossible), the fact that the choice
between Taney's noise or Marshall's silence might affect other
people would give us no guidance. Thus what sounds like a
justice standard is simply a handy way of importing efficiency and
distributional notions too diverse and general in their effect to be
analyzed fully in the decision of a specific case.
The second sounds appealing in a different way since it sounds
like "treating like cases alike." If the entitlement to make noise
in other people's ears for one's pleasure is viewed by society as
closely akin to the entitlement to beat up people for one's pleasure,
and if good efficiency and distributional reasons exist for not
allowing people to beat up others for sheer pleasure, then there
may be a good reason for preferring an entitlement to silence
rather than noise in the Taney-Marshall case. Because the two
entitlements are apparently consistent, the entitlement to silence
strengthens the entitlement to be free from gratuitous beatings
which we assumed was based on good efficiency and distributional
reasons." It does so by lowering the enforcement costs of the
entitlement to be free from gratuitous beatings; the entitlement
to silence reiterates and reinforces the values protected by the
entitlement to be free from gratuitous beatings and reduces the
number of discriminations people must make between one activity
and another, thus simplifying the task of obedience.
compensated, and compensating God for the wrong choice is not feasible. Such
a reason for a choice is, we would suggest, a true nonefficiency, nondistribution
reason. Whether it actually ever plays a role may well be another matter.
" The opposite would be true if noisemaking were thought to be akin to in-
dustry, and drive and silence to lethargy and laziness, and we had good efficiency or
distributional reasons for preferring industry to lethargy.
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The problem with this rationale for the choice is that it too
comes down to efficiency and distributional reasons. We prefer
the silence maker because that entitlement, even though it does
not of itself affect the desired wealth distribution or lead us away
from efficiency in the Taney-Marshall case, helps us to reach
those goals in other situations where there are transaction costs
or where we do have distributional preferences. It does this be-
cause people do not realize that the consistency is only apparent.
If we could explain to them, both rationally and emotionally, the
efficiency and distributional reasons why gratuitous beating up
of people was inefficient or led to undesirable wealth distribution,
and if we could also explain to them why an entitlement to noise
rather than silence in the Taney-Marshall case would not lead to
either inefficiency or maldistribution, then the secondary under-
mining of the entitlement to bodily integrity would not occur. It
is only because it is expensive, even if feasible, to point out the
difference between the two situations that the apparent similarity
between them remains. And avoiding this kind of needless ex-
pense, while a very good reason for making choices, js clearly no
more than a part of the economic efficiency goal.32
Still we should admit that explaining entitlements solely in
terms of efficiency and distribution, in even their broadest terms,
does not seem wholly satisfactory. The reasons for this are worth
at least passing mention. The reason that we have so far explained
entitlements simply in terms of efficiency and distribution is ulti-
mately tautological. We defined distribution as covering all the
reasons, other than efficiency, on the basis of which we might
prefer to make Taney wealthier than Marshall. So defined, there
obviously was no room for any other reasons. Distributional
grounds covered broadly accepted ideas like "equality" or, in
some societies, "caste preference," and highly specific ones like
"favoring the silence lover." We used this definition because
there is a utility in lumping together all those reasons for pre-
ferring Taney to Marshall which cannot be explained in terms
of a desire to make everyone better off, and in contrasting them
with efficiency reasons, whether Paretian or not, which can be so
explained.
Lumping them together, however, has some analytical dis-
32 We do not mean to underestimate the importance of apparent consistency
as a ground for entitlements. Far from it, it is likely that a society often prefers
an entitlement which even leads to mild inefficiencies or maldistribution of wealth
between, say, Taney and Marshall, because that entitlement tends to support other
entitlements which are crucial in terms of efficiency or wealth distribution in the
society at large and because the cost of convincing people that the situations are,
in fact, different is not worth the gain which would be obtained in the Taney-
Marshall case.
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advantages. It seems to assume that we cannot say any more
about the reasons for some distributional preferences than about
others. For instance, it seems to assume a similar universality
of support for recognizing silence lovers as relatively worthier
as there is for recognizing the relative desirability of equality.
And that, surely, is a dangerous assumption. To avoid this dan-
ger the term "distribution" is often limited to relatively few broad
reasons, like equality. And those preferences which cannot be
easily explained in terms of these relatively few broadly accepted
distributional preferences, or in terms of efficiency, are termed
justice reasons. The difficulty with this locution is that it some-
times is taken to imply that the moral gloss of justice is reserved
for these residual preferences and does not apply to the broader
distributional preferences or to efficiency based preferences. And
surely this is wrong, for many entitlements that properly are de-
scribed as based on justice in our society can easily be explained
in terms either of broad distributional preferences like equality
or of efficiency or of both.
By using the term "other justice reasons" we hope to avoid this
difficulty and emphasize that justice notions adhere to efficiency
and broad distributional preferences as well as to other more
idiosyncratic ones. To the extent that one is concerned with con-
trasting the difference between efficiency and other reasons for
certain entitlements, the bipolar efficiency-distribution locution is
all that is needed. To the extent that one wishes to delve either
into reasons which, though possibly originally linked to efficiency,
have now a life of their own, or into reasons which, though dis-
tributional, cannot be described in terms of broad principles like
equality, then a locution which allows for "other justice reasons"
seems more useful.3
III. RULES FOR PROTECTING AND REGULATING ENTITLEMENTS
Whenever society chooses an initial entitlement it must also
determine whether to protect the entitlement by property rules,
by liability rules, or by rules of inalienability. In our framework,
much of what is generally called private property can be viewed
as an entitlement which is protected by a property rule. No one
can take the entitlement to private property from the holder unless
the holder sells it willingly and at the price at which he subjec-
tively values the property. Yet a nuisance with sufficient public
utility to avoid injunction has, in effect, the right to take property
with compensation. In such a circumstance the entitlement to
the property is protected only by what we call a liability rule:
3 But see Fletcher, supra note 21, at 547 n.40.
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an external, objective standard of value is used to facilitate the
transfer of the entitlement from the holder to the nuisance.3 4
Finally, in some instances we will not allow the sale of the prop-
erty at all, that is, we will occasionally make the entitlement
inalienable.
This section will consider the circumstances in which society
will employ these three rules to solve situations of conflict. Be-
cause the property rule and the liability rule are closely related
and depend for their application on the shortcomings of each
other, we treat them together. We discuss inalienability sep-
arately.
A. Property and Liability Rules
Why cannot a society simply decide on the basis of the already
mentioned criteria who should receive any given entitlement, and
then let its transfer occur only through a voluntary negotiation?
Why, in other words, cannot society limit itself to the property
rule? To do this it would need only to protect and enforce the
initial entitlements from all attacks, perhaps through criminal
sanctions,35 and to enforce voluntary contracts for their transfer.
Why do we need liability rules at all?
In terms of economic efficiency the reason is easy enough to
see. Often the cost of establishing the value of an initial entitle-
ment by negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the
entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not
occur. If a collective determination of the value were available
instead, the beneficial transfer would quickly come about.
Eminent domain is a good example. A park where Guidacres,
a tract of land owned by i,ooo owners in i,ooo parcels, now sits
would, let us assume, benefit a neighboring town enough so that
the ioo,ooo citizens of the town would each be willing to pay
an average of $ioo to have it. The park is Pareto desirable if the
owners of the tracts of land in Guidacres actually value their
entitlements at less than $io,ooo,ooo or an average of $io,ooo a
tract. Let us assume that in fact the parcels are all the same and
all the owners value them at $8,ooo. On this assumption, the
park is, in economic efficiency terms, desirable - in values fore-
gone it costs $8,ooo,ooo and is worth $io,ooo,ooo to the buyers.
And yet it may well not be established. If enough of the owners
hold-out for more than $io,ooo in order to get a share of the
$2,000,000 that they guess the buyers are willing to pay over the
34 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312,
257 N.E.2d 870 (17o) (avoidance of injunction conditioned on payment of
permanent damages to plaintiffs).
"The relationship between criminal sanctions and property entitlements will
be examined infra pp. 1124-27.
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value which the sellers in actuality attach, the price demanded
will be more than $io,ooo,ooo and no park will result. The sellers
have an incentive to hide their true valuation and the market will
not succeed in establishing it.
An equally valid example could be made on the buying side.
Suppose the sellers of Guidacres have agreed to a sales price of
$8,ooo,ooo (they are all relatives and at a family banquet decided
that trying to hold-out would leave them all losers). It does not
follow that the buyers can raise that much even though each of
ioo,ooo citizens in fact values the park at $ioo. Some citizens
may try to free-load and say the park is only worth $50 or even
nothing to them, hoping that enough others will admit to a higher
desire and make up the $8,ooo,ooo price. Again there is no reason
to believe that a market, a decentralized system of valuing, will
cause people to express their true valuations and hence yield
results which all would in fact agree are desirable.
Whenever this is the case an argument can readily be made
for moving from a property rule to a liability rule. If society can
remove from the market the valuation of each tract of land, decide
the value collectively, and impose it, then the holdout problem
is gone. Similarly, if society can value collectively each individual
citizen's desire to have a park and charge him a "benefits" tax
based upon it, the freeloader problem is gone. If the sum of the
taxes is greater than the sum of the compensation awards, the
park will result.
Of course, one can conceive of situations where it might be
cheap to exclude all the freeloaders from the park, or to ration
the park's use in accordance with original willingness to pay. In
such cases the incentive to free-load might be eliminated. But
such exclusions, even if possible, are usually not cheap. And the
same may be the case for market methods which might avoid the
holdout problem on the seller side.
Moreover, even if holdout and freeloader problems can be met
feasibly by the market, an argument may remain for employing
a liability rule. Assume that in our hypothetical, freeloaders can
be excluded at the cost of $i,ooo,ooo and that all owners of tracts
in Guidacres can be convinced, by the use of $500,00o worth of
advertising and cocktail parties, that a sale will only occur if they
reveal their true land valuations. Since $8,000,000 plus $i,5oo,ooo
is less than $io,ooo,ooo, the park will be established. But if col-
lective valuation of the tracts and of the benefits of the prospective
park would have cost less than $i,5oo,ooo, it would have been
inefficient to establish the park through the market -a market
which was not worth having would have been paid for. 6
36 It may be argued that, given imperfect knowledge, the market is preferable
because it places a limit - the cost of establishing a market - on the size of the
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Of course, the problems with liability rules are equally real.
We cannot be at all sure that landowner Taney is lying or hold-
ing out when he says his land is worth $12,000 to him. The
fact that several neighbors sold identical tracts for $io,ooo does
not help us very much; Taney may be sentimentally attached to
his land. As a result, eminent domain may grossly undervalue
what Taney would actually sell for, even if it sought to give him
his true valuation of his tract. In practice, it is so hard to de-
termine Taney's true valuation that eminent domain simply gives
him what the land is worth "objectively," in the full knowledge
that this may result in over or under compensation. The same is
true on the buyer side. "Benefits" taxes rarely attempt, let alone
succeed, in gauging the individual citizen's relative desire for the
alleged benefit. They are justified because, even if they do not
accurately measure each individual's desire for the benefit, the
market alternative seems worse. For example, fifty different
households may place different values on a new sidewalk that is
to abut all the properties. Nevertheless, because it is too difficult,
even if possible, to gauge each household's valuation, we usually
tax each household an equal amount.
The example of eminent domain is simply one of numerous
instances in which society uses liability rules. Accidents is an-
other. If we were to give victims a property entitlement not to
be accidentally injured we would have to require all who engage
in activities that may injure individuals to negotiate with them
before an accident, and to buy the right to knock off an arm or
a leg.3  Such pre-accident negotiations would be extremely ex-
possible loss, while the costs of coercion cannot be defined and may be infinite.
This may be true in some situations but need not always be the case. If, for
example, we know that the holdouts would sell for $500,00o more than is offered,
because they recently offered the land at that higher price, coercing them to sell
at an objectively determined price between the seller's offer and the purchaser's
offer cannot result in more than $5oo,ooo in harm. Thus, the costs of coercion
would also not be infinite. Nor is it an answer to say that the man who would
sell for a higher price but is coerced for a lower one suffers an indefinite non-
monetary cost in addition to the price differential simply because he is coerced
and resents it. For while this may well be true, the same nonmonetary resentment
may also exist in those who desire the park and do not get it because the market
is unable to pay off those who are holding out for a greater than actual value.
In other words, unascertainable resentment costs may exist as a result of either
coercion or market failure.
" Even if it were possible, it should be clear that the good which would be
sold would not be the same as the good actually taken. If Taney waives for $i,ooo
the right to recover for the loss of a leg, should he ever lose it, he is negotiating
for a joint product which can be described as his "desire or aversion to gamble"
and "his desire to have a leg." The product actually taken, however, is the leg.
That the two goods are different can be seen from the fact that a man who de-
mands $i,ooo for a x in a iooo chance of losing a leg may well demand more
II08 [Vol. 85: lO89
HeinOnline -- 85 Harv. L. Rev.  1108 1971-1972
PROTECTING ENTITLEMENTS
pensive, often prohibitively so.35 To require them would thus
preclude many activities that might, in fact, be worth having.
And, after an accident, the loser of the arm or leg can always
very plausibly deny that he would have sold it at the price the
buyer would have offered. Indeed, where negotiations after an
accident do occur - for instance pretrial settlements - it is
largely because the alternative is the collective valuation of the
damages.
It is not our object here to outline all the theoretical, let alone
the practical, situations where markets may be too expensive or
fail and where collective valuations seem more desirable. Eco-
nomic literature has many times surrounded the issue if it has not
than $co,coo for a i in io chance of losing it, and more than $Sooo,ooo for the
sale of his leg to someone who needs it for a transplant. See generally CosTs 88-94.
This does not mean that the result of such transactions, if feasible, would necessarily
be worse than the result of collective valuations. It simply means that the situa-
tion, even if feasible, is different from the one in which Taney sells his house for
a given price.
" Such preaccident negotiations between potential injurers and victims are at
times not too costly. Thus in a typical products liability situation the cost of
negotiation over a potential injury need not be prohibitive. The seller of a rotary
lawn mower may offer to sell at a reduced price if the buyer agrees not to sue
should he be injured. Nevertheless, society often forbids such negotiations be-
cause it deems them undesirable. This may occur because of the reasons suggested
in note 37 supra, or for any of the other reasons which cause us to make some
entitlements wholly or partly inalienable, see infra pp. xixi-x5.
Attempts have been made to deal with situations where ex ante negotiations
are not feasible by fiscal devices designed to cause people to reveal their preferences.
One of these contemplates requiring individuals to declare a value on their prop-
erties, or even limbs, and paying a tax on the self assessed value. That value would
be the value of the good if it were taken in an accident or by eminent domain.
See generally N. Tideman, Three Approaches to Improving Urban Land Use, ch.
III (11969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation submitted to U. of Chicago Economics
Department, on file in Yale Law Library). Of course, if the good is only taken
as a result of an accident or eminent domain, the problem of gambling described
in note 37 supra would remain. If, instead, the property or limb could be taken
at will at the self assessed value, serious problems would arise from the fact that
there are enormous nonmonetizable, as well as monetizable, costs involved in making
people put money values on all their belongings and limbs.
An additional, though perhaps solvable, problem with self assessed taxes is the
fact that the taking price would exclude any consumer surplus. This may have no
significance in terms of economic efficiency, but if the existence of consumer sur-
plus in many market transactions is thought to have, on the whole, a favorable
wealth distribution effect, it might well be a reason why self assessed taxes are
viewed with skepticism. Cf. Little, Self-Assessed Valuations: A Critique (972)
(unpublished paper, on file in Harvard Law School Library). The reader might
reasonably wonder why many individuals who view self assessed taxes with skep-
ticism show no similar concerns for what may be a very similar device, optional
first party insurance covering pain and suffering damages in automobile injuries.
See, e.g., Calabresi, The New York Plan: A Free Choice Modification, 71 COLUMII.
L. REV. 267, 268 n.6 (I971).
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always zeroed in on it in ways intelligible to lawyers." It is
enough for our purposes to note that a very common reason, per-
haps the most common one, for employing a liability rule rather
than a property rule to protect an entitlement is that market
valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that is, it is
either unavailable or too expensive compared to a collective valu-
ation.
We should also recognize that efficiency is not the sole ground
for employing liability rules rather than property rules. Just as
the initial entitlement is often decided upon for distributional
reasons, so too the choice of a liability rule is often made because
it facilitates a combination of efficiency and distributive results
which would be difficult to achieve under a property rule. As we
shall see in the pollution context, use of a liability rule may allow
us to accomplish a measure of redistribution that could only be
attained at a prohibitive sacrifice of efficiency if we employed a
corresponding property rule.
More often, once a liability rule is decided upon, perhaps for
efficiency reasons, it is then employed to favor distributive goals
as well. Again accidents and eminent domain are good examples.
In both of these areas the compensation given has clearly varied
with society's distributive goals, and cannot be readily explained
in terms of giving the victim, as nearly as possible, an objectively
determined equivalent of the price at which he would have sold
what was taken from him.
It should not be surprising that this is often so, even if the
original reason for a liability rule is an efficiency one. For distribu-
tional goals are expensive and difficult to achieve, and the collec-
tive valuation involved in liability rules readily lends itself to
promoting distributional goals." This does not mean that distribu-
tional goals are always well served in this way. Ad hoc decision-
making is always troublesome, and the difficulties are especially
acute when the settlement of conflicts between parties is used as
a vehicle for the solution of more widespread distributional prob-
lems. Nevertheless, distributional objectives may be better at-
tained in this way than otherwise."
"9 For a good discussion of market failure which is intelligible to lawyers, see
Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958).
40 Collective valuation of costs also makes it easier to value the costs at what
the society thinks they should be valued by the victim instead of at what the
victim would value them in a free market if such a market were feasible. The
former kind of valuation is, of course, paternalism. This does not mean it is un-
desirable; the danger is that paternalism which is not desirable will enter mind-
lessly into the cost valuation because the valuation is necessarily done collectively.
See pp. 1113-14 infra.
41 For suggestions that at times systematic distributional programs may cause
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B. Inalienable Entitlements
Thus far we have focused on the questions of when society
should protect an entitlement by property or liability rules. How-
ever, there remain many entitlements which involve a still greater
degree of societal intervention: the law not only decides who is to
own something and what price is to be paid for it if it is taken
or destroyed, but also regulates its sale -by, for example, pre-
scribing preconditions for a valid sale or forbidding a sale al-
together. Although these rules of inalienability are substantially
different from the property and liability rules, their use can be
analyzed in terms of the same efficiency and distributional goals
that underlie the use of the other two rules.
While at first glance efficiency objectives may seem under-
mined by limitations on the ability to engage in transactions,
closer analysis suggests that there are instances, perhaps many,
in which economic efficiency is more closely approximated by
such limitations. This might occur when a transaction would
create significant externalities - costs to third parties.
For instance, if Taney were allowed to sell his land to Chase,
a polluter, he would injure his neighbor Marshall by lowering the
value of Marshall's land. Conceivably, Marshall could pay Taney
not to sell his land; but, because there are many injured Marshalls,
freeloader and information costs make such transactions practically
impossible. The state could protect the Marshalls and yet facili-
tate the sale of the land by giving the Marshalls an entitlement
to prevent Taney's sale to Chase but only protecting the entitle-
ment by a liability rule. It might, for instance, charge an excise
tax on all sales of land to polluters equal to its estimate of the
external cost to the Marshalls of the sale. But where there are
so many injured Marshalls that the price required under the lia-
bility rule is likely to be high enough so that no one would be
willing to pay it, then setting up the machinery for collective
valuation will be wasteful. Barring the sale to polluters will be
the most efficient result because it is clear that avoiding pollution
is cheaper than paying its costs - including its costs to the Mar-
shalls.
Another instance in which external costs may justify inaliena-
bility occurs when external costs do not lend themselves to col-
lective measurement which is acceptably objective and nonarbi-
trary. This nonmonetizability is characteristic of one category
of external costs which, as a practical matter, seems frequently to
greater misallocation of resources than ad hoc decisions, see Ackerman, Regulating
Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Sub-
sidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 8o YALE L.J. 1093, 1157-97 (97);
Calabresi, supra note 12.
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lead us to rules of inalienability. Such external costs are often
called moralisms.
If Taney is allowed to sell himself into slavery, or to take
undue risks of becoming penniless, or to sell a kidney, Marshall
may be harmed, simply because Marshall is a sensitive man who is
made unhappy by seeing slaves, paupers, or persons who die
because they have sold a kidney. Again Marshall could pay
Taney not to sell his freedom to Chase the slaveowner; but again,
because Marshall is not one but many individuals, freeloader and
information costs make such transactions practically impossible.
Again, it might seem that the state could intervene by objectively
valuing the external cost to Marshall and requiring Chase to pay
that cost. But since the external cost to Marshall does not lend
itself to an acceptable objective measurement, such liability rules
are not appropriate.
In the case of Taney selling land to Chase, the polluter, they
were inappropriate because we knew that the costs to Taney and
the Marshalls exceeded the benefits to Chase. Here, though we
are not certain of how a cost-benefit analysis would come out,
liability rules are inappropriate because any monetization is, by
hypothesis, out of the question. The state must, therefore, either
ignore the external costs to Marshall, or if it judges them great
enough, forbid the transaction that gave rise to them by making
Taney's freedom inalienable.
4 2
Obviously we will not always value the external harm of a
moralism enough to prohibit the sale.43 And obviously also, ex-
ternal costs other than moralisms may be sufficiently hard to value
to make rules of inalienability appropriate in certain circum-
stances; this reason for rules of inalienability, however, does seem
most often germane in situations where moralisms are involved.4
42 Granting Taney an inalienable right to be free is in many respects the same
as granting most of the people a property entitlement to keep Taney free. The
people may bargain and decide to surrender their entitlement, i.e., to change the
law, but there are limits on the feasibility of transactions of this sort which make
the public's entitlements virtually inalienable.
" For example, I am allowed to buy and read whatever books I like, or to sell
my house to whomever I choose, regardless of whether my doing so makes my
neighbors unhappy. These entitlements could be a form of self paternalism on the
part of the neighbors who fear a different rule would harm them more in the
long run, or they could be selected because they strengthen seemingly similar entitle-
ments. See pp. iio3--o4 supra. But they may also reflect a judgment that the
injury suffered by my neighbors results from a moralism shared by them but not
so widespread as to make more efficient their being given an entitlement to prevent
my transaction. In other words, people who are hurt by my transaction are the
cheapest cost avoiders, i.e., the cost to them of my being allowed to transact freely
is less than the cost to me and others similarly situated of a converse entitlement.
"The fact that society may make an entitlement inalienable does not, of
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There are two other efficiency reasons for forbidding the sale
of entitlements under certain circumstances: self paternalism and
true paternalism. Examples of the first are Ulysses tying him-
self to the mast or individuals passing a bill of rights so that they
will be prevented from yielding to momentary temptations which
they deem harmful to themselves. This type of limitation is not
in any real sense paternalism. It is fully consistent with Pareto
efficiency criteria, based on the notion that over the mass of cases
no one knows better than the individual what is best for him or her.
It merely allows the individual to choose what is best in the long
run rather than in the short run, even though that choice entails
giving up some short run freedom of choice. Self paternalism may
cause us to require certain conditions to exist before we allow a
sale of an entitlement; and it may help explain many situations
of inalienability, like the invalidity of contracts entered into when
drunk, or under undue influence or coercion. But it probably does
not fully explain even these."5
True paternalism brings us a step further toward explaining
such prohibitions and those of broader kinds - for example the
prohibitions on a whole range of activities by minors. Paternalism
is based on the notion that at least in some situations the Mar-
shalls know better than Taney what will make Taney better off. 6
Here we are not talking about the offense to Marshall from Taney's
choosing to read pornography, or selling himself into slavery, but
rather the judgment that Taney was not in the position to choose
best for himself when he made the choice for erotica or servitude.47
course, mean that there will be no compensation to the holder of the entitlement
if it is taken from him. Thus even if a society forbids the sale of one's kidneys
it will still probably compensate the person whose kidney is destroyed in an auto
accident. The situations are distinct and the kidney is protected by different rules
according to which situation we are speaking of.
" As a practical matter, since it is frequently impossible to limit the effect of
an inalienable rule to those who desire it for self paternalistic reasons, self pater-
nalism would lead to some restraints on those who would desire to sell their
entitlements. This does not make self paternalism any less consistent with the
premises of Pareto optimality; it is only another recognition that in an imperfect
world, Pareto optimality can be approached more closely by systems which involve
some coercion than by a system of totally free bargains.
" This locution leaves open the question whether Taney's future well-being wll
ultimately be decided by Taney himself or the many Marshalls. The latter implies
a further departure from Paretian premises. The former, which may be typical of
paternalism towards minors, implies simply that the minors do not know enough
to exercise self paternalism.
" Sometimes the term paternalism is used to explain use of a rule of in-
alienability in situations where inalienability will not make the many Marshalls or
the coerced Taney any better off. Inalienability is said to be imposed because the
many Marshalls believe that making the entitlement inalienable is doing God's
1972] 111 3
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The first concept we called a moralism and is a frequent and
important ground for inalienability. But it is consistent with the
premises of Pareto optimality. The second, paternalism, is also
an important economic efficiency reason for inalienability, but it
is not consistent with the premises of Pareto optimality: the most
efficient pie is no longer that which costless bargains would
achieve, because a person may be better off if he is prohibited from
bargaining.
Finally, just as efficiency goals sometimes dictate the use of
rules of inalienability, so, of course, do distributional goals.
Whether an entitlement may be sold or not often affects directly
who is richer and who is poorer. Prohibiting the sale of babies
makes poorer those who can cheaply produce babies and richer
those who through some nonmarket device get free an "unwanted"
baby.48 Prohibiting exculpatory clauses in product sales makes
richer those who were injured by a product defect and poorer
those who were not injured and who paid more for the product
because the exulpatory clause was forbidden.49 Favoring the
specific group that has benefited may or may not have been the
reason for the prohibition on bargaining. What is important is
that, regardless of the reason for barring a contract, a group did
gain from the prohibition.
This should suffice to put us on guard, for it suggests that direct
distributional motives may lie behind asserted nondistributional
grounds for inalienability, whether they be paternalism, self
paternalism, or externalities." This does not mean that giving
will, that is, that a sale or transfer of the entitlement would injure God. Assum-
ing this situation exists in practice, we would not term it paternalism, because that
word implies looking after the interests of the coerced party. See note 30 supra.
4 This assumes that a prohibition on the sale of unwanted babies can be
effectively enforced. If it can, then those unwanted babies which are produced are
of no financial benefit to their natural parents and bring an increase in well-being
to those who are allowed to adopt them free and as a result of a nonmarket allo-
cation. Should the prohibition on sales of babies be only partially enforceable,
the distributional result would be more complex. It would be unchanged for those
who could obtain babies for adoption legally, i.e., for those who received them
without paying bribes, as it would for the natural parents who obeyed the law,
since they would still receive no compensation. On the other hand, the illegal
purchaser would probably pay, and the illegal seller receive, a higher price than if
the sale of babies were legal. This would cause a greater distributive effect within
the group of illegal sellers and buyers than would exist if such sales were permitted.
'9 See note 37 supra.
"As a practical matter, it is often impossible to tell whether an entitlement has
been made partially inalienable for any of the several efficiency grounds men-
tioned or for distributional grounds. Do we bar people from selling their bodies for
paternalistic, self paternalistic, or moralistic cost reasons? On what basis do we
prohibit an individual from taking, for a high price, one chance in three of having
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weight to distributional goals is undesirable. It clearly is desir-
able where on efficiency grounds society is indifferent between an
alienable and an inalienable entitlement and distributional goals
favor one approach or the other. It may well be desirable even
when distributional goals are achieved at some efficiency costs.
The danger may be, however, that what is justified on, for ex-
ample, paternalism grounds is really a hidden way of accruing
distributional benefits for a group whom we would not otherwise
wish to benefit. For example, we may use certain types of zoning
to preserve open spaces on the grounds that the poor will be
happier, though they do not know it now. And open spaces may
indeed make the poor happier in the long run. But the zoning that
preserves open space also makes housing in the suburbs more
expensive and it may be that the whole plan is aimed at securing
distributional benefits to the suburban dweller regardless of the
poor's happiness."
IV. THE FRAMEWORK AND POLLUTION CONTROL RULES
Nuisance or pollution is one of the most interesting areas
where the question of who will be given an entitlement, and how
it will be protected, is in frequent issue. 2 Traditionally, and very
ably in the recent article by Professor Michelman, the nuisance-
pollution problem is viewed in terms of three rules. 3 First, Taney
to give his heart to a wealthy man who needs a transplant? Do we try to avoid
a market in scarce medical resources for distributional or for some or all of the
efficiency reasons discussed?
"1 There is another set of reasons which causes us to prohibit sales of some
entitlements and which is sometimes termed distributional; this set of reasons
causes us to prohibit sales of some entitlements because the underlying distribu-
tion of wealth seems to us undesirable. These reasons, we would suggest, are not
true distributional grounds. They are, rather, efficiency grounds which become
valid because of the original maldistribution. As such they can once again be
categorized as due to externalities, self paternalism, and pure paternalism: (1)
Marshall is offended because Taney, due to poverty, sells a kidney, and therefore
Marshall votes to bar such sales (a moralism); (2) Taney, seeking to avoid
temporary temptation due to his poverty, votes to bar such sales (self paternalism) ;
and (3) the law prohibits Taney from the same sale because, regardless of what
Taney believes, a majority thinks Taney will be better off later if he is barred
from selling than if he is free to do so while influenced by his own poverty (pure
paternalism). We do not mean to minimize these reasons by noting that they are
not strictly distributional. We call them nondistributional simply to distinguish
them from the more direct way in which distributional considerations affect the
alienability of entitlements.
"2 It should be clear that the pollution problem we discuss here is really only
a part of a broader problem, that of land use planning in general. Much of this
analysis may therefore be relevant to other land use issues, for example exclusion-
ary zoning, restrictive covenants, and ecological easements. See note 58 infra.
3 Michelman, supra note i, at 670. See also RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS
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may not pollute unless his neighbor (his only neighbor let us as-
sume), Marshall, allows it (Marshall may enjoin Taney's nui-
sance).54 Second, Taney may pollute but must compensate Mar-
shall for damages caused (nuisance is found but the remedy is
limited to damages)." Third, Taney may pollute at will and can
only be stopped by Marshall if Marshall pays him off (Taney's
pollution is not held to be a nuisance to Marshall)." In our ter-
minology rules one and two (nuisance with injunction, and with
damages only) are entitlements to Marshall. The first is an entitle-
ment to be free from pollution and is protected by a property rule;
the second is also an entitlement to be free from pollution but is
protected only by a liability rule. Rule three (no nuisance) is in-
stead an entitlement to Taney protected by a property rule, for
only by buying Taney out at Taney's price can Marshall end the
pollution.
The very statement of these rules in the context of our frame-
work suggests that something is missing. Missing is a fourth rule
representing an entitlement in Taney to pollute, but an entitle-
ment which is protected only by a liability rule. The fourth rule,
really a kind of partial eminent domain coupled with a benefits
tax, can be stated as follows: Marshall may stop Taney from
polluting, but if he does he must compensate Taney.
As a practical matter it will be easy to see why even legal
writers as astute as Professor Michelman have ignored this rule.
Unlike the first three it does not often lend itself to judicial
imposition for a number of good legal process reasons. For ex-
ample, even if Taney's injuries could practicably be measured,
apportionment of the duty of compensation among many
Marshalls would present problems for which courts are not well
suited. If only those Marshalls who voluntarily asserted the right
to enjoin Taney's pollution were required to pay the compensation,
there would be insuperable freeloader problems. If, on the other
§§ 157-215 (1965). Michelman also discusses the possibility of inalienability.
Michelman, supra, at 684. For a discussion of the use of rules of inalienability in
the pollution context, see pp. 1123-24 infra.
14 See, e.g., Department of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Galaxy Chem. Co., i
ENVIR. REP. 166o (Md. Cir. Ct. 1970) (chemical smells enjoined); Ensign v. Walls,
323 Mich. 49, 34 N.W. 2d 549 (1948) (dog raising in residential neighborhood
enjoined).
55 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 309 N.Y.S. 2d 312,
257 N.E.2d 870 (1970) (avoidance of injunction conditioned on payment of
permanent damages to plaintiffs).
"e See, e.g., Francisco v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 13 N.J. Misc.
663, i8o A. 843 (Ct. Ch. 1935) (plaintiffs not entitled to enjoin noise and odors
of adjacent sanitarium); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627
(,934) (pollution of percolating waters not enjoinable in absence of negligence).
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hand, the liability rule entitled one of the Marshalls alone to en-
join the pollution and required all the benefited Marshalls to pay
their share of the compensation, the courts would be faced with
the immensely difficult task of determining who was benefited how
much and imposing a benefits tax accordingly, all the while observ-
ing procedural limits within which courts are expected to func-
tion."
The fourth rule is thus not part of the cases legal scholars
read when they study nuisance law, and is therefore easily ignored
by them. But it is available, and may sometimes make more sense
than any of the three competing approaches. Indeed, in one
form or another, it may well be the most frequent device em-
ployed. 8 To appreciate the utility of the fourth rule and to com-
" This task is much more difficult than that which arises under rule two, in
which the many Marshalls would be compensated for their pollution injuries.
Under rule two, each victim may act as an individual, either in seeking com-
pensation in the first instance or in electing whether to be a part of a class seek-
ing compensation. If he wishes to and is able to convince the court (by some
accepted objective standard) that he has been injured, he may be compensated.
Such individual action is expensive, and thus may be wasteful, but it presents no
special problems in terms of the traditional workings of the courts. But where the
class in question consists, not of those with a right to enjoin, but of those who
must pay to enjoin, freeloader problems require the court to determine that an un-
willing Marshall has been benefited and should be required to pay. The basic
difficulty is that if we begin with the premise which usually underlies our notion
of efficiency - namely, that individuals know what is best for them- we are
faced with the anomaly of compelling compensation from one who denies he has
incurred a benefit but whom we require to pay because the court thinks he has
been benefited.
This problem is analogous to the difficulties presented by quasi-contracts. In
terms of the theory of our economic efficiency goal, the case for requiring com-
pensation for unbargained for (often accidental) benefits is similar to the argu-
ment for compensating tort victims. Yet courts as a general rule require com-
pensation in quasi-contract only where there is both an indisputable benefit (usu-
ally of a pecuniary or economic nature) and some affirmative acknowledgment
of subjective benefit (usually a subsequent promise to pay). See A. CORBIn, CON-
TRACTS §§ 23 1-34 (1963). This hesitancy suggests that courts lack confidence in
their ability to distinguish real benefits from illusions. Perhaps even more im-
portantly, it suggests that the courts recognize that what may dearly be an ob-
jective "benefit" may, to the putative beneficiary, not be a subjective benefit-
if for no other reason than that unintended changes from the status quo often
exact psychological costs. If that is the case, there has been no benefit at all in
terms of our efficiency criterion.
5 See A. KNEESE & B. BowER, MANAGING WATER QuALiTr: EcoNomncs, TEcr-
NOLOGY, INsTITUTIONs 98-109 (1963); Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal
Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, IS U.C.L.A.L. R~v. 429, 467-75 (I97).
Virtually all eminent domain takings of a nonconforming use seem to be ex-
amples of this approach. Ecological easements may be another prime example. A
local zoning ordinance may require a developer to contribute a portion of his
land for purposes of parkland or school construction. In compensation for taking
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pare it with the other three rules, we will examine why we might
choose any of the given rules.
We would employ rule one (entitlement to be free from pollu-
tion protected by a property rule) from an economic efficiency
point of view if we believed that the polluter, Taney, could avoid
or reduce the costs of pollution more cheaply than the pollutee,
Marshall. Or to put it another way, Taney would be enjoinable if
he were in a better position to balance the costs of polluting
against the costs of not polluting. We would employ rule three
(entitlement to pollute protected by a property rule) again solely
from an economic efficiency standpoint, if we made the converse
judgment on who could best balance the harm of pollution against
its avoidance costs. If we were wrong in our judgments and if
transactions between Marshall and Taney were costless or even
very cheap, the entitlement under rules one or three would be
traded and an economically efficient result would occur in either
case. 9 If we entitled Taney to pollute and Marshall valued clean
air more than Taney valued the pollution, Marshall would pay
Taney to stop polluting even though no nuisance was found. If we
entitled Marshall to enjoin the pollution and the right to pollute
was worth more to Taney than freedom from pollution was to
Marshall, Taney would pay Marshall not to seek an injunction
or would buy Marshall's land and sell it to someone who
would agree not to seek an injunction. As we have assumed no
one else was hurt by the pollution, Taney could now pollute even
though the initial entitlement, based on a wrong guess of who was
the cheapest avoider of the costs involved, allowed the pollution
to be enjoined. Wherever transactions between Taney and Mar-
shall are easy, and wherever economic efficiency is our goal, we
could employ entitlements protected by property rules even though
we would not be sure that the entitlement chosen was the right
one. Transactions as described above would cure the error. While
the entitlement might have important distributional effects, it
would not substantially undercut economic efficiency.
the developer's entitlement, the locality will pay the developer "damages": it will
allow him to increase the normal rate of density in his remaining property. The
question of damage assessment involved in ecological easements raises similar prob-
lems to those raised in the benefit assessment involved in the question of quasi-
contract. See note 57 supra.
" For a discussion of whether efficiency would be achieved in the long, as well
as the short, run, see Coase, supra note 12; Calabresi, supra note 12 (pointing out
that if "no transaction costs" means no impediments to bargaining in the short or
long run, and if Pareto optimality means an allocation of resources which cannot
be improved by bargains, assumptions of no transaction costs and rationality neces-
sarily imply Pareto optimality) ; Nutter, supra note 12 (a technical demonstration
of the applicability of the Coase theorem to long run problems). See also Demsetz,
supra note 16, at 19-22.
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The moment we assume, however, that transactions are not
cheap, the situation changes dramatically. Assume we enjoin
Taney and there are io,ooo injured Marshalls. Now even if
the right to pollute is worth more to Taney than the right to be
free from pollution is to the sum of the Marshalls, the injunction
will probably stand. The cost of buying out all the Marshalls,
given holdout problems, is likely to be too great, and an equivalent
of eminent domain in Taney would be needed to alter the initial
injunction. Conversely, if we denied a nuisance remedy, the
io,ooo Marshalls could only with enormous difficulty, given free-
loader problems, get together to buy out even one Taney and
prevent the pollution. This would be so even if the pollution harm
was greater than the value to Taney of the right to pollute.
If, however, transaction costs are not symmetrical, we may still
be able to use the property rule. Assume that Taney can buy the
Marshalls' entitlements easily because holdouts are for some
reason absent, but that the Marshalls have great freeloader prob-
lems in buying out Taney. In this situation the entitlement should
be granted to the Marshalls unless we are sure the Marshalls are
the cheapest avoiders of pollution costs. Where we do not know
the identity of the cheapest cost avoider it is better to entitle the
Marshalls to be free of pollution because, even if we are wrong in
our initial placement of the entitlement, that is, even if the
Marshalls are the cheapest cost avoiders, Taney will buy out the
Marshalls and economic efficiency will be achieved. Had we chosen
the converse entitlement and been wrong, the Marshalls could not
have bought out Taney. Unfortunately, transaction costs are
often high on both sides and an initial entitlement, though incor-
rect in terms of economic efficiency, will not be altered in the
market place.
Under these circumstances - and they are normal ones in the
pollution area - we are likely to turn to liability rules whenever
we are uncertain whether the polluter or the pollutees can most
cheaply avoid the cost of pollution. We are only likely to use
liability rules where we are uncertain because, if we are certain,
the costs of liability rules - essentially the costs of collectively
valuing the damages to all concerned plus the cost in coercion to
those who would not sell at the collectively determined figure -
are unnecessary. They are unnecessary because transaction
costs and bargaining barriers become irrelevant when we are cer-
tain who is the cheapest cost avoider; economic efficiency will be
attained without transactions by making the correct initial en-
titlement.
As a practical matter we often are uncertain who the cheapest
cost avoider is. In such cases, traditional legal doctrine tends to
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find a nuisance but imposes only damages on Taney payable to the
Marshalls.6 ° This way, if the amount of damages Taney is made
to pay is close to the injury caused, economic efficiency will have
had its due; if he cannot make a go of it, the nuisance was not
worth its costs. The entitlement to the Marshalls to be free from
pollution unless compensated, however, will have been given not
because it was thought that polluting was probably worth less to
Taney than freedom from pollution was worth to the Marshalls,
nor even because on some distributional basis we preferred to
charge the cost to Taney rather than to the Marshalls. It was so
placed simply because we did not know whether Taney desired to
pollute more than the Marshalls desired to be free from pollution,
and the only way we thought we could test out the value of the
pollution was by the only liability rule we thought we had. This
was rule two, the imposition of nuisance damages on Taney. At
least this would be the position of a court concerned with economic
efficiency which believed itself limited to rules one, two, and three.
. Rule four gives at least the possibility that the opposite en-
titlement may also lead to economic efficiency in a situation of
uncertainty. Suppose for the moment that a mechanism exists for
collectively assessing the damage resulting to Taney from being
stopped from polluting by the Marshalls, and a mechanism also
exists for collectively assessing the benefit to each of the Mar-
shalls from such cessation. Then - assuming the same degree of
accuracy in collective valuation as exists in rule two (the nuisance
damage rule) - the Marshalls would stop the pollution if it
harmed them more than it benefited Taney. If this is possible,
then even if we thought it necessary to use a liability rule, we
would still be free to give the entitlement to Taney or Marshall
for whatever reasons, efficiency or distributional, we desired.
Actually, the issue is still somewhat more complicated. For
just as transaction costs are not necessarily symmetrical under
the two converse property rule entitlements, so also the liability
rule equivalents of transaction costs - the cost of valuing collec-
tively and of coercing compliance with that valuation - may not
be symmetrical under the two converse liability rules. Nuisance
damages may be very hard to value, and the costs of informing all
the injured of their rights and getting them into court may be pro-
hibitive. Instead, the assessment of the objective damage to Taney
from foregoing his pollution may be cheap and so might the as-
"oSee, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334
(I933) (damages appropriate remedy where injunction would prejudice important
public interest); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., X13 Tenn.
331, 83 S.W. 658 (904) (damages appropriate because of plaintiff's ten year delay
in seeking to enjoin fumes).
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sessment of the relative benefits to all Marshalls of such freedom
from pollution. But the opposite may also be the case. As a re-
sult, just as the choice of which property entitlement may be
based on the asymmetry of transaction costs and hence on the
greater amenability of one property entitlement to market cor-
rections, so might the choice between liability entitlements be
based on the asymmetry of the costs of collective determination.
The introduction of distributional considerations makes the
existence of the fourth possibility even more significant. One does
not need to go into all the permutations of the possible tradeoffs
between efficiency and distributional goals under the four rules to
show this. A simple example should suffice. Assume a factory
which, by using cheap coal, pollutes a very wealthy section of
town and employs many low income workers to produce a product
purchased primarily by the poor; assume also a distributional
goal that favors equality of wealth. Rule one -enjoin the nui-
sance - would possibly have desirable economic efficiency results
(if the pollution hurt the homeowners more than it saved the fac-
tory in coal costs), but it would have disastrous distribution
effects. It would also have undesirable efficiency effects if the
initial judgment on costs of avoidance had been wrong and trans-
action costs were high. Rule two - nuisance damages - would
allow a testing of the economic efficiency of eliminating the pollu-
tion, even in the presence of high transaction costs, but would
quite possibly put the factory out of business or diminish output
and thus have the same income distribution effects as rule one.
Rule three - no nuisance - would have favorable distributional
effects since it might protect the income of the workers. But if
the pollution harm was greater to the homeowners than the cost
of avoiding it by using a better coal, and if transaction costs -
holdout problems - were such that homeowners could not unite
to pay the factory to use better coal, rule three would have un-
satisfactory efficiency effects. Rule four - payment of damages to
the factory after allowing the homeowners to compel it to use
better coal, and assessment of the cost of these damages to the
homeowners - would be the only one which would accomplish
both the distributional and efficiency goals. 1
An equally good hypothetical for any of the rules can be
constructed. Moreover, the problems of coercion may as a
61 Either of the liability rules may also be used in another manner to achieve
distributional goals. For example, if victims of pollution were poor, and if society
desired a more equal distribution of wealth, it might intentionally increase "ob-
jective" damage awards if rule two were used; conversely, it might decrease the
compensation to the factory owners, without any regard for economic efficiency
if rule four were chosen. There are obvious disadvantages to this ad hoc method
of achieving distributional goals. See p. iiio supra.
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practical matter be extremely severe under rule four. How do the
homeowners decide to stop the factory's use of low grade coal?
How do we assess the damages and their proportional allocation
in terms of benefits to the homeowners? But equivalent problems
may often be as great for rule two. How do we value the dam-
ages to each of the many homeowners? How do we inform the
homeowners of their rights to damages? How do we evaluate and
limit the administrative expenses of the court actions this solution
implies?
The seriousness of the problem depends under each of
the liability rules on the number of people whose "benefits" or
"damages" one is assessing and the expense and likelihood of
error in such assessment. A judgment on these questions is neces-
sary to an evaluation of the possible economic efficiency benefits
of employing one rule rather than another. The relative ease of
making such assessments through different institutions may ex-
plain why we often employ the courts for rule two and get to
rule four - when we do get there - only through political bodies
which may, for example, prohibit pollution, or "take" the entitle-
ment to build a supersonic plane by a kind of eminent domain,
paying compensation to those injured by these decisions. 2 But
"2 Of course, variants of the other rules may be administered through political
institutions as well. Rule three, granting a property entitlement to a polluter, may
be effectuated by tax credits or other incentives such as subsidization of nonpol-
luting fuels offered for voluntary pollution abatement. In such schemes, as with
rule four, political institutions are used to effect comprehensive benefit assessment
and overcome freeloader problems which would be encountered in a more decen-
tralized market solution. However, this centralization- to the extent that it re-
places voluntary payments by individual pollution victims with collective payments
not unanimously agreed upon- is a hybrid solution. The polluter must assent to
the sale of his entitlement, but the amount of pollution abatement sought and the
price paid by each pollution victim is not subjectively determined and voluntarily
assented to by each.
The relationship of hybrids like the above to the four basic rules can be stated
more generally. The buyer of an entitlement, whether the entitlement is protected
by property or liability rules, may be viewed as owning what is in effect a property
right not to buy the entitlement. But when freeloader problems abound, that
property right may instead be given to a class of potential buyers. This "class"
may be a municipality, a sewer authority, or any other body which can decide to
buy an entitlement and compel those benefited to pay an objective price. When this
is done, the individuals within the class have themselves only an entitlement not
to purchase the seller's entitlement protected by a liability rule.
As we have already seen, the holder of an entitlement may be permitted to
sell it at his own price or be compelled to sell it at an objective price: he may
have an entitlement protected by a property or liability rule. Since, therefore, in
any transaction the buyer may have a property or liability entitlement not to buy
and the seller may have a property or a liability entitlement not to sell, there are,
in effect, four combinations of rules for each possible original location of the en-
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all this does not, in any sense, diminish the importance of the fact
that an awareness of the possibility of an entitlement to pollute,
but one protected only by a liability rule, may in some instances
allow us best to combine our distributional and efficiency goals.
We have said that we would say little about justice, and so we
shall. But it should be clear that if rule four might enable us best
to combine efficiency goals with distributional goals, it might also
enable us best to combine those same efficiency goals with other
goals that are often described in justice language. For example,
assume that the factory in our hypothetical was using cheap coal
before any of the wealthy houses were built. In these circum-
stances, rule four will not only achieve the desirable efficiency and
distributional results mentioned above, but it will also accord
with any "justice" significance which is attached to being there
first. And this is so whether we view this justice significance as
part of a distributional goal, as part of a long run efficiency goal
based on protecting expectancies, or as part of an independent
concept of justice.
Thus far in this section we have ignored the possibility of
employing rules of inalienability to solve pollution problems. A
general policy of barring pollution does seem unrealistic." But
rules of inalienability can appropriately be used to limit the levels
of pollution and to control the levels of activities which cause
pollution."
One argument for inalienability may be the widespread exist-
titlement: voluntary seller and voluntary buyer; voluntary seller and compelled
buyer; compelled seller and voluntary buyer; compelled seller and compelled buyer.
Moreover, since the entitlement to that which is being bought or sold could have
been originally given to the opposite party, there are, in effect, eight possible rules
rather than four.
We do not mean by the above to suggest that political institutions are used only
to allocate collectively held property rights. Quite the contrary, rule two, for in-
stance, gives pollution victims an entitlement protected by a liability rule to be
free from pollution. This rule could be administered by decentralized damage
assessment as in litigation, or it could be effected by techniques like effluent fees
charged to polluters. The latter type of collective intervention may be preferred
where large numbers are involved and the costs of decentralized injury valuation
are high. Still, under either system the "sale price" is collectively determined, so
the basic character of the victims' entitlement is not changed.
" See Michelman, supra note i, at 667.
" This is the exact analogue of specific deterrence of accident causing activities.
See CosTs at 95-129.
Although it may seem fanciful to us, there is of course the possibility that a
state might wish to grant a converse entitlement - an inalienable entitlement to
pollute in some instances. This might happen where the state believed that in the
long run everyone would be better off by allowing the polluting producers to make
their products, regardless of whether the polluter thought it advantageous to accept
compensation for stopping his pollution.
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ence of moralisms against pollution. Thus it may hurt the
Marshalls - gentleman farmers - to see Taney, a smoke-choked
city dweller, sell his entitlement to be free of pollution. A different
kind of externality or moralism may be even more important. The
Marshalls may be hurt by the expectation that, while the present
generation might withstand present pollution levels with no serious
health dangers, future generations may well face a despoiled,
hazardous environmental condition which they are powerless to
reverse." And this ground for inalienability might be strength-
ened if a similar conclusion were reached on grounds of self pater-
nalism. Finally, society might restrict alienability on paternalistic
grounds. The Marshalls might feel that although Taney himself
does not know it, Taney will be better off if he really can see the
stars at night, or if he can breathe smogless air.
Whatever the grounds for inalienability, we should reempha-
size that distributional effects should be carefully evaluated in
making the choice for or against inalienability. Thus the citizens
of a town may be granted an entitlement to be free of water pollu-
tion caused by the waste discharges of a chemical factory; and
the entitlement might be made inalienable on the grounds that
the town's citizens really would be better off in the long run to
have access to clean beaches. But the entitlement might also be
made inalienable to assure the maintenance of a beautiful resort
area for the very wealthy, at the same time putting the town's
citizens out of work.66
V. THE FRAMEWORK AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Obviously we cannot canvass the relevance of our approach
through many areas of the law. But we do think it beneficial to
examine one further area, that of crimes against property and
bodily integrity. The application of the framework to the use of
criminal sanctions in cases of theft or violations of bodily integrity
is useful in that it may aid in understanding the previous material,
especially as it helps us to distinguish different kinds of legal
problems and to identify the different modes of resolving those
problems.
Beginning students, when first acquainted with economic
efficiency notions, sometimes ask why ought not a robber be simply
charged with the value of the thing robbed. And the same question
5 See Michelman, supra note i, at 684.
66 Cf. Frady, The View from Hilton Head, HARPFeR'S, May, 197o, at 103-112
(conflict over proposed establishment of chemical factory that would pollute the
area's beaches in economically depressed South Carolina community; environmental
groups that opposed factory backed by developers of wealthy resorts in the area,
proponents of factory supported by representatives of unemployed town citizens).
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is sometimes posed by legal philosophers.67 If it is worth more to
the robber than to the owner, is not economic efficiency served by
such a penalty? Our answers to such a question tend to move
quickly into very high sounding and undoubtedly relevant moral
considerations. But these considerations are often not very help-
ful to the questioner because they depend on the existence of
obligations on individuals not to rob for a fixed price and the
original question was why we should impose such obligations
at all.
One simple answer to the question would be that thieves do not
get caught every time they rob and therefore the costs to the thief
must at least take the unlikelihood of capture into account. s8 But
that would not fully answer the problem, for even if thieves were
caught every time, the penalty we would wish to impose would be
greater than the objective damages to the person robbed.
A possible broader explanation lies in a consideration of the
difference between property entitlements and liability entitlements.
For us to charge the thief with a penalty equal to an objectively
determined value of the property stolen would be to convert all
property rule entitlements into liability rule entitlements.
The question remains, however, why not convert all property
rules into liability rules? The answer is, of course, obvious.
Liability rules represent only an approximation of the value of the
object to its original owner and willingness to pay such an approxi-
mate value is no indication that it is worth more to the thief than
to the owner. In other words, quite apart from the expense of
arriving collectively at such an objective valuation, it is no
guarantee of the economic efficiency of the transfer. 9 If this is so
with property, it is all the more so with bodily integrity, and we
would not presume collectively and objectively to value the cost
of a rape to the victim against the benefit to the rapist even if
economic efficiency is our sole motive. Indeed when we approach
bodily integrity we are getting close to areas where we do not let
the entitlement be sold at all and where economic efficiency enters
17 One of the last articles by Professor Giorgio Del Vecchio came close to ask-
ing this question. See Del Vecchio, Equality and Inequality in Relation to Justice,
ii NAT. LAW FORuf 36, 43-45 (1966).
"
8 See, e.g., Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
" One might also point out that very often a thief will not have the money to
meet the objectively determined price of the stolen object; indeed, his lack of re-
sources is probably his main motivation for the theft. In such cases society, if it
insists on a liability rule, will have to compensate the initial entitlement holder
from the general societal coffers. When this happens the thief will not feel the
impact of the liability rule and hence will not be sufficiently deterred from engaging
in similar activity in the future. Cf. CosTs at 147-48.
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in, if at all, in a more complex way. But even where the items
taken or destroyed are things we do allow to be sold, we will not
without special reasons impose an objective selling price on the
vendor.
Once we reach the conclusion that we will not simply have
liability rules, but that often, even just on economic efficiency
grounds, property rules are desirable, an answer to the beginning
student's question becomes clear. The thief not only harms the
victim, he undermines rules and distinctions of significance beyond
the specific case. Thus even if in a given case we can be sure that
the value of the item stolen was no more than X dollars, and even
if the thief has been caught and is prepared to compensate, we
would not be content simply to charge the thief X dollars. Since
in the majority of cases we cannot be sure of the economic effi-
ciency of the transfer by theft, we must add to each case an un-
definable kicker which represents society's need to keep all
property rules from being changed at will into liability rules.7 In
other words, we impose criminal sanctions as a means of deterring
future attempts to convert property rules into liability rules.7
The first year student might push on, however, and ask why we
treat the thief or the rapist differently from the injurer in an auto
0 oIf we were not interested in the integrity of property rules and hence we
were not using an indefinable kicker, we would still presumably try to adjust the
amount of damages charged to the thief in order to reflect the fact that only a
percentage of thieves are caught; that is, we would fix a price-penalty which re-
flected the value of the good and the risk of capture.
" A problem related to criminal sanctions is that of punitive damages in in-
tentional torts. If Taney sets a spring gun with the purpose of killing or maiming
anyone who trespasses on his property, Taney has knowledge of what he is doing
and of the risks involved which is more akin to the criminal than the negligent
driver. But because Taney does not know precisely which one of many Marshalls
will be the victim of his actions, ex ante negotiations seem difficult. How then do
we justify the use of criminal sanctions and of more than compensatory damages?
Probably the answer lies in the fact that we assume that the benefits of Taney's
act are not worth the harm they entail if that harm were fully valued. Believing
that this fact, in contrast with what is involved in a simple negligence case, should
be, and in a sense can be, made known to the actor at the time he acts, we pile on
extra damages. Our judgment is that most would act differently if a true cost-
benefit burden could be placed. Given that judgment and given the impossibility
of imposing a true cost-benefit burden by collective valuations -because of in-
adequate knowledge - we make sure that if we err we will err on the side of
overestimating the cost.
There may be an additional dimension. Unlike fines or other criminal sanc-
tions, punitive damages provide an extra compensation for the victim. This may
not be pure windfall. Once the judgment is made that injuries classified as inten-
tional torts are less desirable than nonintentional harms-either because they
are expected to be less efficient or because there is less justification for the tort-
feasor's not having purchased the entitlement in an ex ante bargain - then it may be
that the actual, subjective injury to the victim from the tort is enhanced. One
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accident or the polluter in a nuisance case. Why do we allow
liability rules there? In a sense, we have already answered the
question. The only level at which, before the accident, the driver
can negotiate for the value of what he might take from his
potential victim is one at which transactions are too costly. The
thief or rapist, on the other hand, could have negotiated without
undue expense (at least if the good was one which we allowed to be
sold at all) because we assume he knew what he was going to do
and to whom he would do it. The case of the accident is different
because knowledge exists only at the level of deciding to drive
or perhaps to drive fast, and at that level negotiations with poten-
tial victims are usually not feasible.
The case of nuisance seems different, however. There the
polluter knows what he will do and, often, whom it will hurt. But
as we have already pointed out, freeloader or holdout problems
may often preclude any successful negotiations between the
polluter and the victims of pollution; additionally, we are often
uncertain who is the cheapest avoider of pollution costs. In
these circumstances a liability rule, which at least allowed the
economic efficiency of a proposed transfer of entitlements to be
tested, seemed appropriate, even though it permitted the non-
accidental and unconsented taking of an entitlement. It should
be emphasized, however, that where transaction costs do not bar
negotiations between polluter and victim, or where we are suffi-
ciently certain who the cheapest cost avoider is, there are no effi-
ciency reasons for allowing intentional takings, and property rules,
supported by injunctions or criminal sanctions, are appropriate." -
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to demonstrate how a wide variety
of legal problems can usefully be approached in terms of a specific
framework. Framework or model building has two shortcomings.
whose automobile is destroyed accidentally suffers from the loss of his car; one
whose automobile is destroyed intentionally suffers from the loss of the car, and
his injury is made greater by the knowledge that the loss was intentional, wilful,
or otherwise avoidable.
72 Cj. pp III-x3.
We have not discussed distributional goals as they relate to criminal sanc-
tions. In part this is because we have assumed the location of the initial entitle-
ment- we have assumed the victim of a crime was entitled to the good stolen or
to his bodily integrity. There is, however, another aspect of distributional goals
which relates to the particular rule we choose to protect the initial entitlement.
For example, one might raise the question of linking the severity of criminal sanc-
tions to the wealth of the criminal or the victim. While this aspect of distribu-
tional goals would certainly be a fruitful area of discussion, it is beyond the scope
of the present article.
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The first is that models can be mistaken for the total view of
phenomena, like legal relationships, which are too complex to be
painted in any one picture. The second is that models generate
boxes into which one then feels compelled to force situations which
do not truly fit. There are, however, compensating advantages.
Legal scholars, precisely because they have tended to eschew
model building, have often proceeded in an ad hoc way, looking at
cases and seeing what categories emerged. But this approach also
affords only one view of the Cathedral. It may neglect some rela-
tionships among the problems involved in the cases which model
building can perceive, precisely because it does generate boxes, or
categories. The framework we have employed may be applied in
many different areas of the law. We think its application facili-
tated perceiving and defining an additional resolution of the prob-
lem of pollution. As such we believe the painting to be well
worth the oils.
HeinOnline -- 85 Harv. L. Rev.  1128 1971-1972
